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LABOR LAW - NORRIS-LAGUARDIA Am:- FEDERAL COURTS WrrHOUT
JURISDICTION To ENJOIN STRIKE IN SUPPORT OF DEMAND THAT No JoBs BE
ABOLISHED WrrHOUT RAILWAY UNION'S CONSENT- Respondent railroad
sought authority from the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission
to reduce the number of its station agents. Petitioner union not only
contested but also demanded of the railroad that the following provision
be added to the existing collective bargaining agreement: "No position in
existence on December 3, 1957, will be abolished or discontinued except
by agreement between the carrier and the organization."1 The commission thereafter found maintenance of the particular jobs to be wasteful and
issued a mandatory order directing their abandonment.2 When the union
prepared to strike in support of its demanded contract provision, the railroad sought an injunction in a federal district court. The district court's
denial of injunctive relief was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.a On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,
reversed, three Justices dissenting, one Justice concurring specially.4 The
union's demand presented a lawfully bargainable issue under the Railway
Labor Act, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied to deny jurisdiction to
issue an injunction. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & No. W. Ry.,
362 U.S. 330 (1960).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, when applicable, imposes strict substantive
and procedural requirements and limitations on the granting of injunctive
relief by federal courts, and on its face absolutely denies jurisdiction to enjoin strikes.is The act is applicable where a "labor dispute" exists, and the
act's broad definition of a labor dispute,6 coupled with liberal constructions

1

Principal case at !1!12.

2 Principal case at !148; 69 S.D. PUBUC UTJLlTIES CoMM'N ANN. REP. 87 (1958).
8 The court of appeals reversed the district court on the ground that the subject
of the union demand was within the scope of managerial prerogative and therefore that
the union could not force bargaining thereon. Chicago 8: No. W. Ry. v. Order of R.R.
Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1959).
4 Justices Clark, Whittaker and Frankfurter dissented. Mr. Justice Stewart concurred
in the holding on the ground that there was no substantial federal question sufficient to
give jurisdiction. He stated that if there was a federal question, he agreed with the dissent.
r,47 Stat. 70 (19!12), 29 U.S.C. §§ 104(a), 107-110 (1958). For an example of the nature
of these procedural limitations, 29 U.S.C. § 108 provides that no injunctive relief may be
granted unless complainant has made every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by
negotiation or with the aid of available government arbitration or mediation machinery.
047 Stat. 7!1 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § Illl (1958).
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of this definition by the Supreme Court,7 clearly indicate4 that the act
applied in the principal case. The railroad attempted to avoid this apparent
applicability by stretching a series of exceptions to the Norris Act so as
to embrace the principal case. The exceptions had been created by the
judiciary where rail union bargaining demands were found to be unlawful
in that the demands exceeded the congressionally-granted bargaining powers
of the union under the Railway Labor Act.8 This "unlawful demand" exception had been most broadly applied in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Chicago River & Ind. R.R.,9 where a union struck in support of a demand
involving the interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
The Railway Labor Act permits either party to submit such disputes to
binding arbitration; 10 this the carrier had done. The Court enjoined the
strike on the ground that the specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act
should be enforced despite the general commands of Norris-LaGuardia.
In the principal case the railroad sought to extend this exception, created
for unlawfulness under a labor-regulating statute, to include unlawfulness
under a non-labor statute. The railroad urged that the union demand was
in two respects unlawful under the Interstate Commerce Act.11 First, the
railroad characterized the union's demand as requiring the retention of
jobs found to be wasteful12 by the South Dakota Commission, and alleged
that this violated the National Transportation Policy set forth in the preamble of the Interstate Commerce Act.13 Second, the railroad contended
that the union demand violated that portion of the Interstate Commerce
Act which impliedly left to the states the regulation of station service.14 It
7 See, e.g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938), where the
Court applied Norris-LaGuardia to protect Negro picketing of a grocery store; the
pickets hoped to encourage the hiring of Negroes. In reversing the lower court, Mr. Justice Roberts stated at 559, "We think the conclusion that the dispute was not a labor dispute within the meaning of the Act, because it did not involve terms and conditions of
employment in the sense of wages, hours, unionization or betterment of working conditions
is erroneous."
s In a series of cases where white or white-dominated rail unions contracted with employers to discriminate against Negro labor, the court enjoined the execution of the contracts and held the Norris Act inapplicable. See, e.g., Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
9 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
10 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (i) (m) (1958).
1154 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1958).
12 The expenses of operating several hundred one-man agencies on little-used branch
lines exceeded revenues derived therefrom by $170,399 in 1956. The workload of the
agents involved averaged 59 minutes per day. They were paid for a 40-hour week. Union
work rules required that many of the agents not be on duty when the only train of the
day passed their station. Principal case at 347, 348 nn.1 &: 3.
13 The act's purpose is "to promote safe, adequate, economical and efficient service
and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers."
54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1958) (preamble).
14 Congress in 1958 made substantial revisions in the regulatory system for the nation's railroads and gave the ICC jurisdiction over large areas which the states had previously regulated. However, after extensive consideration it deliberately left to the states
the regulation of station services. H.R. REP. No. 1922, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1958). The
intent of the Congress was to expedite the abandonment of unprofitable and unnecessary
operations. S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. 11 (1958). The Senate sub-com-
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argued that the union, by demanding that its permission be obtained for
any abandonment of station services, was using its congressionally-established
bargaining powers to usurp state authority in an area where Congress intended the states to be supreme.15
The majority, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Black, found no
conflict between the union's demand and the South Dakota Commission
order. This mooted the railroad's argument that the union could not lawfully usurp state authority, and made ineffectual the argument based on
conflict with the Interstate Commerce Act's efficiency commands, for the
only instances of inefficiency involved were those ordered to be abolished
by the state agency. Instead, Mr. Justice Black found that the union merely
wanted to discuss actions which might vitally and adversely affect the
seniority, security, and stability of railroad jobs; that the union had not
defied any state order; and that the union's demand was not prompted by
the railroad's action in seeking state authority to put its agency consolidation plan into effect.1 6 These findings can be squared with significant facts
in the case only with the greatest difficulty.17 Mr. Justice Black must have
reasoned that the union's demand, if granted, would not be per se a veto
of the action of the South Dakota Commission, but rather would be only
an unexercised contractual veto power. One can only speculate upon the
mittee which conducted the hearings recommended that the railroads help themselves by
applying more often to state agencies for authority to abandon uneconomic services. S.
REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. 21 (1958). On this point the union urged that
the state commission had no implied authority from Congress, and that the commerce
clause of the federal constitution preempted state power to interfere with the exercise
of a federally-granted bargaining power. See note 20 infra.
15 The dissent accepted essentially the position argued by the railroad. This position
is an extension of the "unlawful demand" exception to Norris-LaGuardia to include
demands unlawful under a non-labor statute. But cf. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v.
Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91 (1940), holding that union conduct violating the Sherman Act (a non-labor statute) did not warrant creating an exception to
Norris-LaGuardia.
16 Principal case at 340.
17 At the South Dakota Commission hearings, the union contended that the existing collective bargaining agreement prevented abolishment of jobs without the union's
consent. The union next demanded the inclusion in the collective bargaining contract
of a clause expressly setting forth such an agreement. Principal case at 347. The union in
a letter accompanying its strike ballot stated that the demanded agreement was necessary
to prevent the effectuation of the railroad's plan for eliminating the agencies. The
union's strike call stated that the need for the demanded agreement was demonstrated by
the state commission's order to abolish the agencies. Principal case at 350 nn.9 &: 10. After
the union made its demand, the railroad offered several methods of cushioning the
effect of abolition of the jobs, among them the transfer of the agents involved to productive jobs, the limiting of job abolishments to an agreed-upon number per year, and
the payment of supplemental unemployment benefits to the agents affected. The union
flatly refused to discuss any of these proposals. The railroad negotiator then indicated that
the company's door would always be open for any discussion of the whole area. The
union president testified that the only alternatives he gave the railroad were to agree
to the demanded provision or to suffer a strike. Principal case at 349 n.6. Mr. Justice
Black's conclusion that the union's purpose in striking was only to gain the right to discuss with management the railroad actions involved does not seem consistent with these
facts.
·
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reasons why the Court avoided finding a conflict on these facts. In the
principal case the existence of a conflict was obvious, but it is easy to
visualize cases in which it would be difficult to determine whether a similar
demand was to be used in conflict with a state order. Perhaps by refusing to recognize a conflict until a union actually attempts to enforce an
existing contract which is in conflict with a state order, the Court was
seeking to avoid facing future cases with the necessity of determining a
difficult factual question - whether a non-existent but demanded contract
provision would or could be used in a manner inconsistent with state agency
action. Furthermore, had the Court acknowledged a conflict and found the
bargaining demand unlawful, it would have been faced with the alternative
of creating a further judicial exception to the plain terms of Norris-LaGuardia, or of holding that the federal courts were powerless to restrain a
union from the unlawful use of its federally-granted bargaining powers.18
By waiting to find conflict at a stage where the Court must decide whether
to enforce a collective bargaining agreement, the Court will have avoided
the specific Norris-LaGuardia prohibition of injunction of strikes. If the
enjoining of the execution of the contracts is required, the Court then
will need to create an exception only to the procedural requirements of
Norris. This would be a less difficult course of action in view of several precedents ignoring these requirements.19
While the avoidance of these problems may have motivated the "no conflict" finding in the principal case, the finding will raise a number of other
problems in the future. Collective bargaining in the industry may not be
facilitated because the parties are given no indication of what their rights
will be when the union attempts to enforce a contract which conflicts with
a state order. Nevertheless, the holding does represent a considerable tactical victory for the unions, for now a union can make it abundantly clear
that it will strike in de facto opposition to a state order, and the railroad
will not be entitled to judicial relief. 20 In view of the fact that the rail
unions today are shrinking in membership and desperately fear loss of

18 If such a holding had been made, however, there would have presumably been no
federal constitutional obstacle to the state courts' using their equity powers to enjoin
strikes in order to effectuate state agency orders. Sec note 20 infra.
19 The discrimination cases ignored the procedural requirement and enjoined the
execution of contracts. See note 8 supra. The procedural requirements have likewise been
ignored in enforcing contracts to arbitrate differences. Textile Worker's Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The same result was reached in Virginian Ry. Co. v. System
Federation No. 40, Ry. Employees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937), enforcing the duty to bargain.
Further, in the context of enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement the Chicago
River case may well apply to allow an injunction forcing arbitration, since the controversy arguably will grow out of the interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement.
20 Congressional legislation under the commerce clause of the federal constitution
pre-empts state court authority to interfere with a rail union's lawful exercise of its
bargaining powers under the Railway Labor Act. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553
(1957); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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jobs,21 there ·will be few of their leaders who can afford not to go all the
way in resisting state orders to abandon services. Add to this the fact that
a prolonged strike today would toll the death knell of a number of the nation's railroads, 22 and it is apparent that the railroads will now experience
even greater difficulties in abandoning uneconomic services. The finding
also leaves state regulatory agencies uncertain as to their powers vis-a-vis
union bargaining rights, and will therefore not improve the state regulation
of railroads. Finally, the finding will prove troublesome in the context of
Interstate Commerce Commission regulatory orders. The Commission has
broad powers to determine the disposition of employees when authorizing
mergers and abandonments of lines of track.23 If the rationale of the
principal case is followed, a union dissatisfied with such a disposition of
employees ·will be able to strike for an agreement that an authorized merger
or abandonment not be made ,vithout its consent, and there ,vill be "no
conflict" beaveen the union demand and the order.24
Apart from a consideration of the "no conflict" finding, the decision also
may have important implications ,vith regard to the scope of the subjects
about which management is legally obligated to bargain under the National
Labor Relations Act. Section 8 (d) of the NLRA defines the duty of unions
and employers to bargain on "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment."25 In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner
Corp.,2 6 bargaining demands were categorized as "mandatory" or "permissive." A demand is mandatory only if its subject matter falls within the
scope of section 8 (d). It was held that each party has an obligation to
bargain in good faith on mandatory demands, but that a party who insists
on agreement on a permissive demand, to the extent that negotiations on a
mandatory subject reach an impasse, commits an unfair labor practice.
Borrowing from these ideas, the court of appeals in the principal case
theorized that demands falling outside the scope of section 2, First,27 of
the Railway Labor Act were not mandatory subjects of bargaining, and
21 Time, Oct. 17, 1960, p. 104.
22 E.g., the plight of the New York, N.H.

8: H.R.R. was reported on June 27, 1960:
Losses over the last three years have totaled $17.4 million and are expected to reach $23
million by the end of 1960. According to its president, the railroad was then juggling
every bit of available cash to stay in a currently solvent position, and the president expected
insolvency within 12 months if help in the form of lower taxes and subsidies was not
forthcoming. The statement was made in connection with an ICC investigation of the
particular railroad's troubles. Wall Street Journal, June 27, 1960, p. I, col. 4.
23 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5 (2) (f) (1958); ICC v. Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373 (1942).
24 Rail unions are now making strong efforts in the courts to block ICC-approved
mergers until job security .is guaranteed. Time, Oct. 17, 1960, p. 104.
.25 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1958).
26 356 U .s. 342 (1958).
27 This section requires employers and unions to bargain on rates of pay, rules, and
working conditions. 48 Stat. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1958). The duty is enforceable by order of a federal court. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, Ry.
Employees, supra note 19.
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therefore that a strike in support of such demand would be unlawful and
could be enjoined.28 Since the Supreme Court did find the demand within
the scope of section 2, First,29 and made no mention of the mandatorypermissive concept, there is no basis for inferring that a Borg-Warner-type
doctrine has been applied to the Railway Labor Act. However, in finding
that the union's demand was within the scope of section 2, First, the Court
at least made it certain that henceforth employers subject to the Railway
Labor Act have a duty to bargain in good faith over demands that no jobs be
abolished without union consent despite objections that such demands invade what was considered to be a traditional area of exclusive managerial
prerogative. In justifying this finding the Court emphasized that Congress
requires the ICC to include in orders approving railroad consolidations conditions which insure that for a certain term the consolidation will not
worsen the position of the employees with respect to employment, and also
that Congress authorizes the ICC to include conditions protecting employees
in authorizations of abandonment.ao This emphasis suggests that employers
subject to the NLRA will not have a duty to bargain over similar demands
until there is comparable federal legislation to protect employees against
displacement in this area. But the Court also emphasized that in the past
unions and railroad employers had bargained over displacement benefits.al
Thus it may be that a history of bargaining over displacement of workers
will alone be enough to support a holding that an employer subject to the
NLRA has a duty to bargain in good faith over a demand that no jobs be
eliminated without union consent.
David G. Hill

2s Chicago &: No.W. Ry. v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1959).
The court of appeals suggested both that a dispute over a permissive issue is per se not
within the Norris-LaGuardia definition of a labor dispute, and that a strike in support
of a demand on a permissive subject is unlawful and falls within the Chicago River excep•
tion to Norris-LaGuardia.
29 Principal case at 339.
so Principal case at 337, 338.
31Ibid.

